is solved a multi-armed bandit problem arising in the theory of learning in games. We propose a short and elementary proof of this result based on a variant of the Kronecker lemma.
. . , d} plays at time n he is rewarded by f i (x n ), otherwise he gets nothing; only one player can play at any given time. Then the sequence x is a playing strategy adopted by the group of players and Q(x) is the global worst cumulative payoff rate of the strategy x for the whole community of players (regardless of the cumulative payoff rate of each player). This interpretation slightly differs from that proposed in [2] where a single player is considered. This player has the choice among d + 1 "arms" at every time n with a reward f i (x n ) when choosing "arm" i. We adopt the first one in view of our illustration.
In [2] an answer (see Th. 1 below) is provided to the following question
What are the good strategies (for the group)?
The authors rely on some recent tools developed in stochastic approximation theory (see e.g. [1] ). The aim of this note is to provide an elementary and shorter proof based on a slight improvement of the Kronecker lemma.
As an illustration, we emphasize that in such a game a greedy strategy is usually not optimal, even for the "individual winner".
The canonical inner product on R d will be denoted by
The main result is the following theorem (first established in [2] 
Set for every u ∈ P d+1 ,
and
Furthermore, for any strategy x such thatx n →x ∞ ,
In particular there is no better strategy than choosing the player at random according to an i.i.d. "Bernouilli strategy" with parameterx
The key of the proof is the following slight extension of the Kronecker lemma.
Lemma 1 ("à la Kronecker" lemma). Let (b n ) n≥1 be a nondecreasing sequence of positive real numbers converging to +∞ and let (a n ) n≥1 be a sequence of real numbers. Then
, and C 0 = 0 so that a n = b n ∆C n . As a consequence, an Abel transform yields
Consequently, lim inf n→+∞ C n being finite, one concludes that for every ε > 0,
Proof of Theorem 1. First note that for every u = (u
so that
The last equality reads using Assumption (2) and notation (1),
Consequently, by the fundamental formula of calculus applied to Φ on (
where w(g, δ) denotes the uniform continuity δ-modulus of a function g. One derives from the uniform continuity of ∇Φ on the compact set S d that R n → 0 as n → +∞. Finally, the continuous function Φ being bounded on the compact set S d , the partial sums
remain bounded as n goes to infinity. Lemma 1 then implies that lim inf
One concludes by noting that on one hand lim sup
and that, on the other hand, the function q being continuous, Proof. This follows from the obvious fact that the continuous function
Corollary 1. When d + 1 = 2 (two players), Assumption (2) is satisfied as soon as
u 1 → f 1 (1 − u 1 , u 1 ) − f 0 (1 − u 1 , u 1 ) on [0, 1] has an antiderivative.
Further comments:
• If one considers a slightly more general game in which some weighted strategies are allowed, the final result is not modified in any way provided the weight sequence satisfies a very light assumption. Namely, assume that at time n the reward is
) satisfy all the conclusions of Theorem 1 mutatis mutandis.
• Several applications of Theorem 1 to the theory of learning in games and to stochastic fictitious play are extensively investigated in [2] which we refer to for all these aspects. As far as we are concerned we will simply make a remark about some "natural" strategies which illustrates the theorem in an elementary way.
In the reward function at time k, i.e. f x k (x k−1 ), x k represents the competitive term ("who will play?") and x k−1 represents a cooperative term (everybody's past behaviour has influence on everybody's reward).
This cooperative/competitive antagonism induces that in such a game a greedy competitive strategy is usually not optimal (when the players do not play a symmetric role). Let us be more specific. Assume for the sake of simplicity that d + 1 = 2 (two players). Then one may consider without loss of generality thatx n = σx n i.e. thatx n is a [0, 1]-valued real number. A greedy competitive strategy is defined by player 1 plays at time n (i.e.
i.e. the player with the highest reward is nominated to play. Then, for every n ≥ 1,
and it is clear that
On the other hand, the proof of Theorem 1 implies that lim inf
Hence, there is at least one weak limiting distributionμ ∞ of the sequence of empirical measuresμ n := 
If the greedy strategy (x n ) n is optimal then dist(
then the purely competitive strategy is never optimal for the group of two players. Let us be more specific on the following example: set for two positive parameters a = b f 0 (x) := a x and
Then one checks that argmax q = {1/2} and f 0 (1/2) = f 1 (1/2).
One first shows that the greedy strategy x = (x n ) n≥1 defined by (3) satisfies
On the other hand, any optimal (cooperative) strategy (like the i.i.d. Bernoulli(1/2) one) yields an asymptotic (relative) global payoff rate for the "looser").
If an optimal cooperative strategy is adopted by the players the "winner" remains the same but with an asymptotic payoff rate equal to max(a,b) 4
(the "looser" gets min(a,b) 4
). Consequently (when a = b), an optimal cooperative strategy always yields to the winner a strictly higher asymptotic payoff rate than the greedy one. This is also true for the looser.
• A more abstract version of Theorem 1 can be established using the same approach. The finite set {0, 1, . . . , d} is replaced by a compact metric set K, P d+1 is replaced by the convex set P K of probability distributions on K equipped with the weak topology and the continuous function f : K × P K → R is still supposed to derive from a potential function in some sense.
